ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
This volume is premised on the notion of the 'Negotiators dilemma', common to all realworld coalition games, in which party elites must compete for scarce political goods and resources (such as policies, public office and votes) and are therefore presented with mixed incentives as to what balance to strike between consolidating and enhancing the collective utility of a coalition and pursuing a more narrow instrumentalism in order to seek better deals within or without the existing coalition. In the context of UK politics, the current 'ConDem' coalition has not yet had to confront this dilemma in its starkest form but long experience from more established coalition arenas, such as those found in Germany, suggest that it is only a matter of time before it does.
Experience, of course, provides a template for future expectations and the German experience teaches us two clear lessons. First, as is discussed in the introduction to this volume, that inter-party conflict within orthodox 'one-plus-one' coalitions (involving one of the big Volksparteien as formateur and usually just one smaller party as junior partner) has been easier to manage than it has in Grand coalitions. This is because, in the former, the instrumentalism of the formateur is tempered by the desire to collaborate with the smaller party in the long term whereas, in the latter, the two Volksparteien remain fierce competitors from the start and openly seek the option to 'defect' to a one-plus-one coalition with a smaller surplus majority and more chance to determine the overall policy-orientation of the government. Given the downside risk of Grand coalitions, therefore, one can assume that party elites had strong and substantive reasons for entering into one in 2005. As the introduction to this volume argues, these included the desire of the SPD leadership to 'bind in' the party to the reformist path embarked upon under the previous Schröder governments, the absence of alternatives for the CDU/CSU, and also the desire of reformers from both parties to reduce transaction costs in tackling Germany's reform blockage 1 . The first and third of these issues are dealt with in more depth elsewhere in the volume.
The second lesson, which is also touched upon in the introduction, is that Grand coalitions are subject to the risk of electoral attack from smaller parties, either because of voter unease at the prospect of Grand coalitions per se or because of the problems of coalition performance noted above, or simply because the centrist and rather technocratic nature of such coalitions opens up political space on the flanks of the party system 2 . This is in addition to the fact that, although incumbent governments in Germany have not traditionally been 'punished' by voters to the extent that they have elsewhere, government parties and junior coalition partners in particular have tended to suffer a net loss of vote share in the medium term 3 . This last point is of particular relevance to the strategic calculations of the SPD and is examined later in the article.
Thus, the lessons of the past did not bode well for the Grand coalition and, as we shall see, raise questions about why the two Volksparteien chose to enter into such a coalition after the 2005 federal election. In particular, they cast some doubt about the motives of the SPD for making such a choice. This article does not attempt to provide answers to these questions but, in assessing the Grand coalition in the context of the German party system, it does problematise some of the issues that underpin them. In doing so it will become apparent that, looking through the lens of coalition theory, the superior payoffs -be they office-seeking or policy-oriented -accruing to the SPD in choosing the Grand coalition option over alternative coalition options are not immediately apparent.
Moreover, it argues that in terms of vote-seeking, the SPD's decision appears to have been a major strategic mistake.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. First, I present a synthetic framework for explaining coalition formation, derived from the established literature and in a manner appropriate to the institutional context of German party politics. Second, I flesh out that institutional context, with an emphasis upon the conditions in which the 2005 coalition game was played, with an emphasis upon the falling electoral support for the two Volksparteien and the subsequent decline in their integrative roles. The section will highlight why, in both instrumental and normative terms, the logic of the Grand coalition option was questionable. Third, I then use the synthetic framework to try to explain some of the issues that underpinned the process of coalition formation in 2005 and to try to establish why the Grand coalition option was chosen. Fourth, I then assess the impact of the grand coalition on the German party system. Finally, the article concludes with a brief summary and discussion of the data and arguments.
EXPLAINING COALITION FORMATION IN GERMANY
For students of coalition behaviour, the formation of what appear to be surplus majority coalitions highlights a key analytical question: what is the trade-off between office-seeking and policy-seeking payoffs? For students of coalition behaviour in Germany, the nature of this trade off is a particularly thorny issue; not just because of the relative size of the surplus majority that is normally associated with Grand coalitions but also because of the highly constrained strategic environment in which German political parties operate. These constraints are the product of the historical development of the Federal Republic and the 'logic of appropriateness' 4 that is associated with it, including parties' own conception of their role as part of the post-1949 Parteienstaat. This is discussed at greater length in the next section of the article. However, these constraints also manifest themselves in a more contingent fashion, through the shaping of party programs and also in terms of the selfconstraints that political parties impose on themselves through the pre-election statements ruling out particular coalition arrangements even before any votes have been counted 5 .
Such 'semi-institutional' factors are not limited to Germany and similar constraints can be found in other polities 6 . Nevertheless, for the purposes of this article, in Germany officeseeking models of coalition behaviour must be strongly modified by the role of ideology, norms and beliefs.
Studies of the process of coalition maintenance lend themselves to the kind of indepth analysis of the distribution of policy portfolios and policy content of coalition agreements that soften the edges of the office-seeking/policy-seeking dilemma. However, the balancing of these two types of payoffs is far more contested in the theoretical work on coalition formation, upon which most of the early coalition literature was focused and where game-theoretical models quickly gained the ascendancy. These game-theoretical accounts are highly formalised and, although they are in fact often rival or even contradictory theories, they make explicit certain common assumptions about the 'rational actor' nature of political parties and the 'constant sum' and 'zero-sum' nature of the coalition games they played. Much of the theoretical modelling of coalition games is of limited utility in explaining real-world coalition formation but the best of it still has a profound analytical power and elegance of abstraction that allows us to highlight key empirical issues.
For instance, Riker's 7 prediction that players will try to create coalitions that are only as large as they believe will ensure winning and that repeated plays of the coalition game will produce a 'minimum winning' coalition of 50 per cent plus one vote fails to predict outcomes, particularly in the context of 'strong' party systems such as those found at the national and sub-national levels in Germany. By contrast, von Neumann and Morgenstern's 8 notion of the 'minimal winner' -bigger than the minimum winner but nevertheless the smallest feasible majority given the rules of the game -is better supported empirically 9 .
What is important is that, in applying either model to real-world politics, we must account for the 'irrationality' of the persistence of strong and normally indivisible parties in pure office-seeking coalition games. The constraining effects of party organisations are returned to later in this article.
Moving on to inter-party relations, Gamson's 10 assumption that, all things being equal, parties will favour the 'cheapest winning' coalition', in which they are the larger partner in a coalition, is a useful discriminator when considering coalition options that appear to have no clear formateur. This is also true of Leiserson 14 . As a result, there has subsequently been a great deal of scholarship that models multi-dimensional policy spaces through the use of 'core theory' 15 and the calculation of dimension-by-dimension medians 16 or DDMs. The former approach focuses on the relative positions of political parties at the start of the coalition game 17 , whilst the latter concentrates on the later stages of the coalition formation process and, in particular, involves a degree of retroduction about the motives of players from the allocation of policy portfolios 18 . These approaches seek to identify the 'political heart' 19 or 'latticing' 20 of players' preference curves in n dimensional policy space. More recently, there have also been attempts 21 to operationalise the highly influential formal model put forward by Sened 22 , drawing upon associated work by Crombez 23 and Baron and Diermeir 24 . Sened's model is arguably one of the most concerted attempts to date to model a utility function that (1) contains both an office-and policy-seeking component; (2) allows variance in the weighting of the two components between political parties; (3) does not collapse the two components into one dimension; and (4) allows for and predicts the formation of minority governments. However, as even the most successful applications acknowledge, this strand of research is still at an early stage of development and datasets are incomplete 25 .
Although they are all important studies, this article does not draw directly upon the insights of the multi-dimensional scholarship described above. The reasons for this are both theoretical and empirical. In terms of theory, the disequilibriating impact of adding additional dimensionality introduces a whole new set of debates that are beyond the scope of a descriptive analysis such as this 26 and have no practical value to it. More importantly, one cannot avoid two key empirical objections to these models, be they 'thin' and parsimonious or 'thick' and contextualised. First, if we consider the initial post-election stage of the coalition game, where party weights are first revealed and players' strategic objectives are revised in the light of them, it is hard to support the assumption embedded in these models that politicians are cognitively capable 27 of making the sort of multidimensional calculus envisaged by them or, indeed, willing to absorb the kind of deliberation costs that such calculations would require within complex organisations 28 such as political parties. This is also, in a roundabout fashion, an echo of the point about collective action problems put forward by Leiserson. Second, although the DDM approach does cast valuable analytical light on the division of portfolios at the mature stage of the process of coalition formation, this tells us more about the relative success of the political parties within the coalition negotiation process, rather than about with whom political parties decide to negotiate in the first place. Well-established theoretical and empirical studies of complex organisations reveal that the process of formal negotiations not only increases levels of trust and information but also results in delegation from the very top of the organisation to meso-level working groups 29 . This means that it is questionable whether one can deduce the full potential power of parties at T1 (immediately after the election) from outcomes at T3 (the signing of the formal coalition agreement) as the parameters of the coalition game at T2 (the start of formal coalition negotiations) change profoundly once one or more parties become, as it were, 'preferred bidders'. Thus, whilst DDM models are strongly explanatory, they and other 'pure' policy-oriented models are less effective in predicting real-world coalition outcomes 30 .
As a result of these theoretical and empirical objections, this study uses a fairly straightforward synthesis of existing models to examine the formation of the Grand Coalition in 2005 and its context within, and impact upon, the German party system. It assumes the following:  Fourth, the dominant left-right dimension is cross-cut by a libertarian-authoritarian dimension 32 with limited predictive power but significant explanatory value when assessing government declarations and portfolio allocations.
 Fifth, the trade-off between office-seeking and policy-oriented payoffs is complex and will vary across time, space, and -after Sened -the preferences of individual political parties.
 Sixth, all strategic decisions are subject to 'pure time preference'. This means that players will place a premium on payoffs accruing nearer in time and discount those that are more remote in time. There are debates about the size of the discount rate 33 and even the ethics of setting one in the first place 34 that are beyond the scope of this study. However, unless we assume that players are indifferent to time,
we must assume that some degree of time discounting takes place. Thus, in the broadest terms, this analysis is based upon the assumptions that ceteris paribus (1) office-seeking payoffs have more immediate utility and will be weighted by players accordingly; (2) that policy-oriented payoffs as a whole are therefore discounted but that more weight will be placed upon those policies that bring more immediate utility ('low hanging fruit' such as tax cuts or rises and other forms of headlinegrabbing legislation) compared with those that require longer-term utility flows or more immediate costs (such as sustained long term investment or reforms with long timelines); and (3) parties will prefer coalition arrangements that have been triedand-tested, preferably at the national level but also over time at the at either the sub-national level, rather than have to price in the opportunity costs of new coalition arrangements 35 .
This last point about players' preference for established coalition models over new and untested options is particularly relevant to our understanding of why the SPD and CDU/CSU chose a Grand coalition over other feasible options. The Grand coalition option was, as we have discussed, not without its own risks but it nevertheless represented the orthodox coalition option. Moreover, the dynamics of discounting untested coalition options was also As a result, with the benefit of hindsight it is now accepted that neither party benefited electorally from participation in the Grand Coalition. This is explored in more depth later in the article. It was an arrangement that magnified the very technocratic and rent-seeking tendencies that had increasingly alienated voters from the late 1980s onwards 50 . Thus, within the real-world constraints of German politics and in the absence of individual defections from one party to another, minimal winning coalitions are subject to 'swing' 51 when both parties in a two-party coalition or at least one party in a multi-party coalition are able to transform a winning coalition into a losing coalition by its defection from a coalition (or vice-versa) 52 . At the same time, however, not all feasible coalitions are minimal winners and it is often the case that that these are subject to swing as well. Thus, it
follows that under conditions of increasing party system fragmentation we would expect three things to happen. First, we would expect the number of potential minimal winning coalitions and coalitions with swing to increase. Second, we would expect that the number of coalitions with swing will be at least as great as the number of minimal winning coalitions.
Third, that because the potential number of winning coalitions rises exponentially as players are added 53 the entry of new political parties into the coalition game will mean that the number of coalitions with swing will increasingly exceed the number of minimal winning coalitions. coalitions there were also five mathematically-feasible surplus majority coalitions that also involved a party that enjoyed swing. And because they were surplus majority coalitions it followed that if there was a single party with the power of defection that could not be one of the smaller parties but instead had to be one of the two Volksparteien 54 . Taken in the round, therefore, despite the overall decline in the Volkspartei vote the outcome of this process of party system change represented a shift in coalition power away from the small parties and the FDP in particular and towards the CDU/CSU and SPD. Table One about here Of course, as already discussed, the process of coalition formation in real-world party systems is constrained by party ideology, as well as broader norms and beliefs. This is where our synthesis of coalition models can sharpen the analysis. In Table One I In the light of the data and arguments presented through Figure Two and Table One, the logic of the decision of the SPD to enter a Grand coalition is at least questionable. Figure   Two demonstrates that the distribution of party weights following the 2005 federal election generated seven minimal winning coalitions and 12 coalitions with swing. Obviously, many of these minimal winning options were unfeasible but, if we assume that political parties want to join MCWs, the SPD had clear advantage over its rival Volkspartei. Unlike the CDU/CSU, which failed to secure enough seats to make possible its preferred option of a Black-Yellow coalition and lacked any plausible alternatives, the SPD was not compelled by legislative mathematics or even simple ideological adjacency to enter a Grand coalition. The smallest potential minimal winner was a Red-Red-Green coalition (with the PDS/Left Party and the Greens), which would have had 327 seats, giving it a governing majority of 19.
Moreover Red-Red-Green was also the smallest MCW and, if it had formed, the SPD -which was still Mparty within the Bundestag -would have retained its status as MpartyK. By contrast, the decision to enter a Grand Coalition meant that the SPD abdicated its status as MpartyK to the CDU/CSU, with all the implications that held for maintaining leverage over the direction of policy formulation and legislative management over the course of the life of the coalition. On the other hand, given the ideological distance that was still very evident between the SPD and PDS/Left Party in 2005, it is fair to argue that the Grand coalition option was in fact the MCW with the smallest ideological range. In addition it does fulfil the bargaining proposition, in that it is the only majority coalition option with only two players and thus would be expected to suffer less from collective action problems than other coalition options. The collective action problem can also be analysed in terms of our pure time preference assumption. As is discussed in the introduction and elsewhere in this volume, it can be argued that Germany is ruled by a permanent 'unofficial' Grand coalition anyway and it is a coalition model that has been tried-and-tested elsewhere, not least at the federal level between 1966 and 1969. By contrast, even if we discount the animosity that existed between the SPD and Left Party in particular and also assume that the Greens would have been willing to take part in such a coalition arrangement, at T1 a Red-Red-Green coalition would have appeared to many within the SPD as an untried option in which the downside risk was obvious whilst the long-term benefits, although potentially substantial,
were not immediately apparent. In short, for the SPD leadership the Grand coalition option was, in more ways than one, the conservative choice.
The consequences of that choice are analysed elsewhere in this volume and it is up to the reader to make her judgement as to whether it was the right one. However, in as far as we might expect the Grand coalition to restore the flagging fortunes of the two Volksparteien and perhaps reverse the long-term decline discussed earlier in this article, it was clearly the wrong choice -as the next section demonstrates. borrow the language of Donald Rumsfeld, these risks were 'known knowns' rather than the 'known unknowns' of Red-Red-Green.
Of course, the impact of pure time preference is that decisions taken in relative haste can be repented at leisure. This is true for both Volksparteien and certainly the case for the SPD. As the article argues, the Grand coalition magnified the very technocratic and rent-seeking tendencies that had alienated voters and failed to consolidate the position of either party within the federal party system. Moreover, for the SPD the Grand coalition however, is that the decision not to take seriously any alternative coalition options led to four wasted years in which the major strategic dilemma that still faces the party -how to Point measurements Mean
